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SUCCESSIONS AND DONATIONS
Carlos E. Lazarus*
DONATIONS INTER VIVOS
Formal Requirements
In order to be valid, a donation inter vivos, whether of
immovables, movables or incorporeals, must be made by an act
passed before a notary public and two witnesses;' conse-
quently, a donation of immovables by an act under private
signature is a nullity. Nevertheless, the fact that a donation
has not been made in the form required by law, does not neces-
sarily entitle the plaintiff in nullity to a summary judgment
declaring the inefficacy of the donation; the particular facts
and circumstances under which the donation is made may be
such as to preclude the plaintiff from asserting the nullity. It
was so held in Sarpy v. Sarpy,2 in which a husband sought to
annul two donations of immovables he had made to his wife.
These donations, although appearing on their face to have been
made in compliance with article 1536 of the Civil Code, were
not in fact so made.3 In reversing the summary judgment ren-
dered in favor of the plaintiff-husband and remanding the case
for further proceedings, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal
indicated that a trial on the merits could produce sufficient
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1536, 1538. The Civil Code recognizes an exception for a
donation of corporeal movables which may also be made by simple delivery of the thing
given to the donee whose acceptance is implied by his taking corporeal possession of
it. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1539, 1541.
A limitation as to the applicability of article 1536 to donations of incorporeals
should also be recognized by the jurisprudence as explained in the text that follows.
See text at notes 5-6, intro.
2. 354 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert denied, 356 So. 2d 436 (La. 1978)
(judgment not final).
3. Parol evidence is admissible to establish that an act purporting to be in au-
thentic form was not in fact confected in the manner provided by law. American Bank
& Trust Co. v. Carson Homes, Inc., 316 So. 2d 732 (La. 1975). In the instant case the
evidence established that one of the acts of donation had been executed at the same
time by the donor and the donee, the notary and the witnesses having affixed their
signatures thereto a day or two later; the other act had been executed by the parties
in the presence of the witnesses, the notary having affixed his signature two days later.
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evidence to suggest a formal defect purposely created by the
donor in order to provide him a means of revoking an otherwise
irrevocable act. Given the particular factual situation pre-
sented, the decision is correct.'
In previous issues of this Law Review, the writer has indi-
cated the necessity for a re-examination of article 1536 of the
Civil Code, particularly as it relates to its application to incor-
poreal rights, the transfer of which is governed by other laws.'
Two apparently conflicting decisions from the First and Fourth
Circuits indicate the urgency of adopting the suggestion made
by the late Justice St. Paul in his concurring opinion in
Succession of LeRoy' that article 1536 should be limited in its
application and that it should not be extended to instruments
the transfer and negotiation of which are governed by the com-
mercial law. Houston v. McCoy7 involved a suit on a promis-
sory note made by the defendant payable to his order and by
him endorsed and delivered to the plaintiff's wife in part pay-
ment of the price of property that defendant had purchased
from the plaintiff's wife. The note was in the possession of the
plaintiff, the trial court having determined that the wife had
donated the same to her husband.' Although recognizing that
a promissory note, negotiable in form, made payable to the
maker's own order and by him endorsed in blank becomes
4. The court noted that the donor was a lawyer and that the notary who later
signed the acts of donation was his secretary. It then proceeded to say:
If [the donee] can prove he purposefully created a defect in the form of the
donations in order to reserve a method of revoking an otherwise irrevocable
donation, we would be disinclined to allow [the] use of the courts for the
purpose of accomplishing such a scheme. The purpose of requiring an act of
donation to be executed before a notary and two witnesses is to protect the donor
from fraudulent schemes . . .; the requirement was not intended to provide the
donor with a scheme for avoiding the effects of C.C. Art. 1468 .
Sarpy v. Sarpy, 354 So. 2d at 575.
5. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977
Term-Successions and Donations, 38 LA. L. Rav. 397 (1978); The Work of the Louis-
iana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Successions and Donations, 37 LA. L.
REv. 421 (1977).
6. 157 La. 1077, 1083, 103 So. 328, 331 (1925).
7. 351 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
8. "This court finds that Myrtle Houston desired to and did make a manual
donation of this note to plaintiff." Id. at 830. "The decedent gave the note in question
to the plaintiff in 1974 .... " Id. at 832.
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bearer paper and is then negotiable by delivery, and that under
the applicable provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Law,,
a negotiable instrument may be effectively negotiated even
though no value has been given, the First Circuit Court of
Appeal reached the conclusion that because the donation of the
note to the husband "was not in authentic form, the transfer
was a nullity and the note was not negotiated . . .and the
plaintiff was not a 'holder' of the note"'' 0 and, therefore, was not
entitled to enforce payment from the maker. By contrast, as
the writer understands the decision in Succession of Tebo,"
bearer bonds (which are negotiable instruments) may be the
subject of a manual gift, and the delivery thereof by the donor
to the donee is a negotiation of the bonds constituting the
donee the holder of the bonds."2 The writer submits that when
a negotiable instrument payable to bearer is transferred by one
9. The case arose prior to the effective date of article 3 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code adopted by 1974 La. Acts, No. 92, adding LA. R.S. 10:1-101 et seq.
10. Houston v. McCoy, 351 So. 2d 829, 833 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977). With this
conclusion the writer caniot agree. The error in which the court seems to have fallen
is in stating that "a negotiable instrument may be negotiated by gift as well as for
value. "Id. at 833 (emphasis added). Under the applicable provisions of the Negotiable
Instruments Law, a negotiation takes place when the instrument is transferred from
one person to another in such a manner as to constitute the transferee the holder
thereof. If the instrument is payable to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery only, and if
payable to order, it is negotiated by delivery plus the necessary endorsement of the
transferor. LA. R.S. 7:30 (1950), repealed by 1974 La. Acts, No. 92, §2. There can be
no doubt that the note was negotiated by the wife to her husband when she transferred
or delivered the note to him and that he thus became the holder thereof entitled to
receive payment. LA. R.S. 7:88 (1950), repealed by 1974 La. Acts, No. 92. It may very
well be that, having paid no value, the plaintiff was not a holder in due course (LA.
R.S. 7:52 (1950), repealed by 1974 La. Acts, No. 92) and therefore subject to any
defenses that were available as between the defendant and the plaintiff's wife. But to
say that there was no negotiation because the transfer was not accompanied by a
supplementary act of donation made in the form prescribed by article 1536 of the Civil
Code, is to adopt a new concept of "negotiation" which is foreign to the law of commer-
cial paper. What would have been the decision had the note been made payable to the
wife and by her endorsed and delivered to the husband?
11. 358 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
12. The court stated:
Bearer bonds may also be transferred by manual gift, ... as in any manual
gift-delivery must be had to make the gift effective . . . .The delivery re-
quired by law is delivery by the donor or. . .by another acting upon the donor's
orders . . . .We hold the bonds not manually given because there was no
showing of delivery by the donor . . ..
358 So. 2d at 339.
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person to another a negotiation takes place, and the transferee
becomes the holder of the instrument; whether or not the trans-
feree has paid value for the instrument is immaterial.
TESTAMENTARY DIsPosrrIONS
Formal Requirements
It should be self-evident that the purpose of legislation
prescribing the formalities that must be observed in the confec-
tion of testaments is not only to impress upon the deceased the
significance of his declarations of last will, but also to guard
against imposition, deception or fraud and to provide the
means of establishing the authenticity of the testament and
satisfactory evidence of the all-important animus testandi of
the disposer who, after his death, is no longer present to clarify
or contradict other evidence concerning the effectiveness and
validity of his dispositions.'3 In the case of nuncupative testa-
ments that have been reduced to writing, it is no idle formality,
therefore, to require that the testament be executed in the
presence of witnesses whose function is clearly to establish the
capacity and total independence of the testator and to ensure
that the other formalities required in the confection of the tes-
tament are observed." And it goes without saying that this
function can only be discharged by witnesses who are compe-
tent to do so at the time of the execution of the testament. Thus
the Civil Code declares absolutely incapable of being witnesses
to testaments: Persons who are insane; those who are blind and
cannot therefore tell whether the testament was written or
completed in the manner required by law; the deaf, who can
neither hear the dictation by the testator nor the reading back
of the testament by the notary who received it, or the reading
of the testament by the testator to the witnesses or by one of
the witnesses to the others; and, for the same reason, those who
do not know nor understand the language in which the testa-
ment was dictated or read back to the testator.'5 It is also clear
13. This is the reason for prohibiting the purely nuncupative or verbal testament.
LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1575, 1576.
14. LA. CMv. CODE arts. 1644-46; LA. CODE CIv. P. arts. 2883-86.
15. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1591; Debaillon v. Fuselier, 159 La. 1044, 106 So. 559
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that a person though not otherwise incompetent to serve as a
testamentary witness may nevertheless also be disqualified to
perform his functions impartially because of his pecuniary in-
terest in not disclosing vices or defects in the confection of the
testament, his paramount purpose thus being to ensure that
the nullity of the testament is never established. Thus the Civil
Code also declares incapable of being witnesses to testaments
those who are constituted legatees therein."0 Nevertheless, in
(1925); Succession of Dauzat, 212 So. 2d 523 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968). See also LA. R.S.
9:2443 (Supp. 1952 & 1964), which provides that persons who know not how or are
unable to read cannot be witnesses to a testament confected under the provisions of
LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1964 & 1976).
16. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1592. See article 975 of the Code Napoleon which is even
more extensive in providing that testaments cannot be witnessed by legatees, nor by
their relations by blood or affinity up to the fourth degree, nor by the clerks of notaries
by whom the testament is executed. The determination of these incapacities is to be
made as of the time of the execution of the testament. 5 M. PLAINIOL, G. RIPEST, A.
TRASOT & Y. LOuRSOUARN, TRAITt PRATIQUE DE Daorr CML FRANqus n° 556, at 702 et
seq. (2d ed. 1957). In mystic testaments the witnesses only witness the act of super-
scription and not the contents of the testament itself, and consequently the prohibition
of article 1592 of the Civil Code does not apply to them. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1593.
Since it is no longer open to question that a so-called statutory will must be
executed in the presence of "witnesses not otherwise disqualified under article 1591
and 1592 of the Civil Code," it should also follow that a legatee cannot serve as a
witness to a statutory will. See LA. R.S. 9:2442 (Supp. 1952), as amended by 1974 La.
Acts, No. 246, §1 and 1976 La. Acts, No. 333 §1 (legislatively overruling Woodfork v.
Sanders, 248 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied, 252 So. 2d 455 (La. 1971),
which had held that article 1592 of the Civil Code was inapplicable to the statutory
will).
The disqualification of witnesses on account of interest is not new. It is the subject
of legislation in the various states of the United States, in some of which the strict
disqualification has been somewhat tempered by providing that the legacy to the
legatee-witness shall be null. For a comprehensive study of these statutes, see Rees,
American Wills Statutes, 46 VA. L. Rxv. 613 (1946). The prohibition seems to have
originated in the English Statute of Frauds of 1676 which required the attestation of
will by "three or four credible witnesses," and Helliard v. Jennings, 91. Eng. Rep.
1237 (K.B. 1699), where a will was declared invalid because one of the necessary
witnesses was also a devisee on the theory that because he would profit by the will's
being sustained, the devisee could not qualify. In the later case of Holdfast v.
Donsing, 93 Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1746), it was held that the competency of the
witnesses had to be judged as of the time the testament was confected and that the
devisee's subsequent renunciation of the legacy did not restore his capacity. Said the
court: "It was objected, that nothing vests till the death of the devisor, and therefore,
at the time of the attestation he [the witness] had no interest. But the answer is, that
he was then under the temptation to commit fraud, and that is what the Parliament-
intended to guard against." Id. at 1165.
Under section 2-505 of the Uniform Probate Code, a will is not invalid because it
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Lee v. Kincaid,'7 the Second Circuit Court of Appeal upheld
the validity of a nuncupative testament by private act in which
one of the necessary witnesses had been named as a legatee
where the latter had renounced his legacy after the death of the
testator and before the testament had been offered for pro-
bate." It is the considered opinion of this writer that this result
could only have been reached by straining the construction of
article 1592 of the Civil Code, which unequivocally states that
testaments cannot be witnessed by those who are constituted
legatees under whatsoever title it may be;'" therefore, absent a
sufficient number of other qualified witnesses present at the
confection of the testament, the testament offered for probate
should have been declared null.
is signed by an interested witness. The official comment following this section states:
"Interest no longer disqualifies a person as a witness, nor does it invalidate or forfeit a
gift under the will." It also states, "[Tihe purpose of this change is not to foster the
use of interested witnesses, and attorneys will continue to use disinterested witnesses
in execution of wills. "(Emphasis added.) Would not the opposite be true once the back
door has been opened?
17. 359 So. 2d 232 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 So. 2d 198 (La. 1978).
18. Writs were refused by a divided court, Sanders, C.J. and Summers and
Marcus, J.J., dissenting. Justice Tate, concurring with the majority, stated: "The
incapacity of a witness under C.C. art. 1592 (when the witness renounces the legacy
before the will is probated) is not such a formality as will make the testament null and
void, C.C. Art. 1593 [1595?], such as is the competency of a witness under arts. 1578,
1581, 1591." Lee v. Kincaid, 360 So. 2d 198 (La. 1978). If the reason for the incapacity
declared in article 1592 of the Civil Code is a valid one, why should the subsequent
renunciation of the legacy by the witness restore his capacity when he may very well
have had ulterior motives for renouncing?
19. Although admitting that the possible intent is to declare the invalidity of
testaments that are witnessed by those who are also constituted legatees, the court
found a "more plausible construction of the statutory language," viz., that the word
named used in article 1592 means nothing more than "identified by name," and that
"the crucial determination at the probate of the will becomes the status of the witness
then, i.e. whether or not any witness is in actuality a legatee at the time of probate so
as to bring into operation the prohibition of C.C. art 1592. . . ." Lee v. Kincaid, 359
So. 2d 232, 234 (1978) (emphasis added). The court made parenthetical reference to
article 1959 of the Civil Code, apparently in support of its "construction" of article
1592. That article provides: "However general be the terms in which a contract is
couched, it extends only to the things concerning which it appears that the parties
intended to contract." (Emphasis added.) It is suggested that the provision of the Civil
Code that applies in interpreting or construing another provision of the Code itself is
article 13, which instructs that when a law is clear and free from all ambiguity, the
letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
1979] WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1977-1978 767
Revocation or Caducity
The Louisiana Civil Code provides for the tacit revocation
of testaments or of the dispositions they contain either by (1)
the confection of a new testament,. valid in form, incompatible
with it, or (2) by the inter vivos alienation by the testator of
the thing bequeathed; 0 these two methods of revocation,
whether total or partial, are based on the same concept, viz.,
the testator's change of will manifested by a new disposition of
the object of the legacy either by an act inter vivos or in con-
templation of death."1 The alienation of the thing bequeathed
imports a revocation, however, only when the alienation is
made by the testator himself,"2 and the maxim factum tutoris,
factum pupilli should not apply since the right to make or to
revoke a testament is personal and incommutable. 2 Neverthe-
less, the alienation by another of the thing bequeathed, though
not resulting in a revocation, may result in the caducity of the
legacy simply because the thing bequeathed will no longer be
found in the patrimony of the testator, and in such cases, there-
fore, the legatee will be entitled neither to the thing be-
20. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1693, 1695, 1696.
21. For a more detailed discussion of the subject matter, see The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1976-1977 Term-Successions and Donations, 38
LA. L. REv. 313, 395-407 (1978).
22. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1695 and 1696 speak of a donation inter vivos or of a sale
made by the testator of the whole or of a part of the thing bequeathed. It results,
therefore, that these articles are inapplicable where the thing bequeathed has been
seized and sold at the instance of the creditors of the testator; where it has been sold
to effect a partition by licitation; where it has been expropriated for public purposes;
or where it has been sold by the tutor or curator of the testator in the course of his
administration. There is some language, however, in the opinion rendered in the in-
stant case, Spiller v. Herpel, 357 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 So.
2d 637 (La. 1978), implying that the sale of the thing by another with the consent or
approval of the testator would amount to a revocation. The court states:
Since the sale of the premises in question was accomplished by the curator of
the testatrix, and since the testatrix did not personally give her consent or
approval to the sale at the time of its consumation [how could she if she was
an interdict?] it must be the holding of this Court in accordance with the above
cited authorities that this action did not constitute a revocation as contem-
plated by the pertinent articles of the Louisiana Civil Code.
357 So. 2d at 575 (emphasis added). In light of the conclusion reached by the court,
the above quoted language must be considered dictum.
23. This is implicit from LA. CiV. CODE arts. 1571, 1575, 1578, 1581, 1588, 1690,
1691.
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queathed nor to the price of the alienation." This important
distinction was recognized and applied by the First Circuit
Court of Appeal in Spiller v. Herpel. 51 In that case, the testatrix
had bequeathed her residence to her nephew. Thereafter she
was interdicted and her curator, in the course of his adminis-
tration of the interdict's estate and with the approval of the
court,2" sold the residence. The trial court's judgment dismiss-
ing the alternative claim of the nephew against the executrix
for the delivery of the legacy or of the value thereof was af-
firmed by the appellate court, which adopted as its own the
opinion of the trial judge in which French doctrine and juris-
prudence is discussed at length. The trial judge held, in accord
with the cited French authorities, that, although not revoked
by the subsequent sale by the curator, the legacy had neverthe-
less lapsed and that, as in the case of the revocation of legacies
by the sale of the thing bequeathed, the legatee was not enti-
tled to the proceeds of the sale. 7
When the caducity results from the prior death of the lega-
tee,28 the legacy is without effect and will devolve either upon
the universal legatee, if any, or upon the heirs of the testator."
Accordingly, in Succession of Moore,30 in which the heirs of
predeceased legatees filed suit for a declaratory judgment seek-
24. The object of the legacy to which the legatee is entitled is a determinate
thing, not the estimated value thereof nor any other thing. See LA. Civ. CODE arts. 1700,
1701, 1702. It should follow, however, that in the case of caducity resulting from the
sale by another of the thing bequeathed, the bequest would be effective if the thing
sold is subsequently reacquired by the testator prior to his death.
25. 357 So. 2d 572 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 358 So. 2d 637 (La. 1978).
26. Caducity would also result even if the sale or alienation by the curator is
unauthorized or fraudulently made as, for example, where there had actually been no
reason or necessity for the sale. In such cases, the legatee would have his action in
damages against the curator.
27. The court stated:
It would appear that the leading authority in Louisiana and the majority of the
French commentators support the view that the alienation of the thing be-
queathed by the curator of an interdict observing all legal formalities and in due
course of his administration caused the legacy to lapse, so that the legatee can
claim neither the value thereof nor the price still due.
357 So. 2d at 575.
28. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1697.
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 1709; Succession of Burnside, 35 La. Ann. 708 (1883).
30. 353 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
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ing to be recognized as the owners by representation of the
bequests that had been made, the First Circuit Court of Appeal
properly affirmed the judgment of the trial court" dismissing
the plaintiffs' claims on an exception of no cause of action.
Probate-Lost or Destroyed Testaments
It has long been recognized by the jurisprudence of Louis-
iana that when a testament has been lost or accidentally de-
stroyed, extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove that the tes-
tament actually existed and the contents thereof, whereupon
the testament may be probated and ordered executed." In
Succession of Jones, " it was proper for the court, therefore, to
admit to probate a photocopy of the olographic testament of
the testator, the original of which had been destroyed by the
appellant after the death of the testator.3 In Succession of
Davis, 3 5 the court had no difficulty in setting aside an ex parte
judgment recognizing the defendants as the heirs at law of the
deceased and as such sending them into possession. 3' The
plaintiffs had adduced proof of the execution of a valid statu-
tory will and of the contents thereof, notwithstanding that they
produced neither the testament nor a copy thereof.37
31. It is submitted that the suit was frivolous to begin with. Legatees may not
be represented, and in the absence of a vulgar substitution, the heirs of a predeceased
legatee take nothing.
32. Jones v. Mason, 234 La. 116, 99 So. 2d 46 (1958); Succession of Nunely, 224
La. 251, 69 So. 2d 33 (1954); Succession of O'Brien, 168 La. 303, 121 So. 847 (1929).
See also Succession of Boyd, 306 So. 2d 687 (La. 1975), and cases therein cited.
33. 356 So. 2d 80 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 357 So. 2d 1168 (La. 1978).
34. The court noted that the testament had not been revoked by the testator,
but that it had been torn by the appellant once he had determined that the destruction
of the testament was in his best interests. See Smith v. Shaw, 221 La. 896, 60 So. 2d
865 (1952), wherein an olographic testament was destroyed by the testator's attorney
in the presence of and with the consent of the testator upon execution of a subsequent
testament by public act.
35. 347 So. 2d 906 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1978).
36. The ex parte judgment had been rendered on the basis of an affidavit swear-
ing that the deceased had died intestate.
37. Judge Hood dissented being of the opinion that the alleged statutory will had
not been judicially recognized and probated.

